All that Glitters is Code: RuneScape Gold and Digital Theft

Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Lakeman[1] marks a significant development in criminal law as it confronts the realities of digital economies. This decision confirms that in-game virtual currency may constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968. In January 2026, the judgment arrives at a particularly significant time as the Property (Digital Assets Etc.) Act 2025 received Royal Assent in December 2025, though the Act does not itself determine what constitutes property[2]. The implications extend beyond the case, as it highlights fundamental questions about the nature of property in an increasingly digitalised world and the criminal law’s capacity to adapt to technological innovation.

The defendant, a content developer for Jagex Ltd, stood accused of exploiting his position to steal 705 billion ‘gold pieces’ from 68 players’ accounts in the massively multiplayer online game RuneScape, converting them to Bitcoin and fiat currency worth approximately £543,123.[3] Players could lawfully purchase ‘bonds’ from Jagex for £6, redeemable for 14 days’ membership or around 13 million gold pieces, while the same amount could be obtained illicitly for approximately £2.70.[4] This price disparity framed the preliminary legal issue of whether such virtual assets were capable of being stolen.

Redefining property

The initial reasoning proceeded from the premise that Lord Wilberforce’s four-part test in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth[5] provided the appropriate framework for determining whether gold pieces constituted property. This test requires that a right or interest be ‘definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability’.[6] This has long served as the touchstone for recognising novel forms of property in English civil law.[7]

The Court of Appeal held that whilst the Ainsworth criteria might constitute ‘helpful indicia in the criminal context’, they were ‘not determinative’.[8] This represented a significant departure from the assumption that civil law property principles should govern the interpretation of section 4. The court grounded this approach in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Colliers Ltd that ‘property’ is ‘not a term of art but takes its meaning from its context’.[9] What constitutes property for theft purposes need not mirror what constitutes property for civil enforcement, remedies, or commercial transactions.

The court first emphasised the functional purpose of theft law: criminalising the dishonest taking of things that can, as a matter of ordinary language, be described as capable of being stolen.[10] Section 4 of the Theft Act definition is intentionally expansive to capture the full range of stealable assets.[11] Second, the court observed that there existed ‘no conceptual difficulty’ in something constituting property for theft purposes whilst lacking enforceable private law rights.[12] The criminal law serves different ends from the civil law. Whereas civil property law allocates ownership rights and governs commercial dealings, criminal law protects against dishonest deprivation of valuable things.

This principled divergence found support in R v Hinks,[13] where the House of Lords held that conduct could constitute theft even when it involved what civil law treated as a valid transfer conferring an indefeasible title. The Court of Appeal in Lakeman held that the validity of title transfer does not prevent appropriation under section 1 of the Theft Act, and the absence of enforceable civil property rights does not preclude an asset from constituting property under section 4.[14]

Complex civil law disputes about the nature of property rights, which might require extensive factual findings by juries or technical legal determinations, need not obstruct the straightforward question of whether something valuable has been dishonestly taken. The criminal law can thus protect against theft of genuinely valuable assets without becoming entangled in civil law technicalities developed for different purposes.[15]

Virtual Assets

The Court of Appeal rejected the trial judge’s reliance on the pure information principle derived from Oxford v Moss.[16] The principle applies only to knowledge that exists solely in a person’s mind and can be shared without depriving the original holder of its use. Virtual gold, by contrast, had an objective existence in the game’s systems, was subject to exclusive control, and could be transferred in a way that deprived another player of it. The court reaffirmed that confidentiality cannot transform information into property for theft, even though other areas may protect confidential information.

The critical question became whether gold pieces constituted ‘pure information’ or something more substantial. The Court of Appeal held decisively that they were functional assets with objective existence independent of the code representing them.[17] In Tulip Trading Ltd v Bitcoin Association BSV that whilst Bitcoin consists of ‘literally’ of software, it possesses ‘properties which exist outside the minds of individuals’, albeit ‘only inside computers as a consequence of the Bitcoin software’.[18]

The court distinguished sharply between the instantiated code, being the specific data on Jagex’s servers representing a player’s gold piece holdings, and the functional gold pieces themselves as they appear and operate within the game.[19] This distinction proved critical for several reasons. The code itself, written partly in proprietary RuneScript and partly in JavaScript, could be replicated on another computer without creating anything of value.[20] Its value as data derived solely from intellectual property protection was expressly disclaimed by the prosecution. By contrast, the functional gold piece, the thing that players see, use, and trade, possesses independent value stemming from its role within the game’s economic system.

The Law Commission’s Supplementary Report, extensively quoted by the court, explained this conceptual distinction through an analogy to banknotes: knowing a banknote’s serial number does not duplicate the note’s function or value because ‘that number is of no use except as an intrinsic element of the banknote in question’.[21] Similarly, possessing the data representing gold pieces serves no purpose without its instantiation within the game’s system. Even recreating all elements of RuneScape’s network would create ‘a materially identical, yet distinct, network, populated by materially identical but distinct, rivalrous’ assets.[22]

This functional approach resolved the defendant’s argument about code ‘deletion’ during transfers. When player A transfers gold pieces to player B, the code allocating them to A is deleted and replaced with code allocating them to B.[23] The defendant suggested this meant no property ‘transferred’. The court dismissed this as formalistic: what matters is the ‘visual and functional transfer’ experienced by players, not the underlying mechanism by which the game’s software implements that transfer.[24] The analogy to cryptocurrency proved that Bitcoin ‘transfers’ similarly involve changes to blockchain code, yet this does not prevent Bitcoin from being treated as transferable property.[25]

The court adopted the Law Commission’s definition of rivalrousness: ‘if the use or consumption of the thing by a person, or a specific group of persons, necessarily prejudices the use or consumption of that thing by one or more other persons’.[26] Gold pieces clearly satisfied this test. Once consumed in the game (purchasing items, paying for services), they cease to exist. Once transferred to player B, they become unavailable to player A and all other players.[27] The username and password system enforces this exclusivity, ensuring that possession and use remain rivalrous.

Crucially, the court held that Jagex’s ability to delete or cap gold pieces did not negate their rivalrous character.[28] Rivalrousness concerns the use and consumption of property, not mere possession.[29] A car remains rivalrous even when hired under a terminable-at-will contract; a candle remains rivalrous even when lent on terms allowing the lender to reclaim and burn it.[30] The possibility of future removal or destruction does not affect whether the current use is exclusive.

The Gaming Industry and Virtual Property Rights

Virtual items, currencies, and assets pervade modern gaming, from RuneScape’s gold pieces to Fortnite’s V-Bucks, FIFA Ultimate Team cards, and countless others. Players invest substantial time and money in accumulating these assets, creating thriving secondary markets despite contractual prohibitions. The Law Commission provisionally concluded that most in-game assets would not constitute property for civil law purposes, primarily because their existence depends on proprietary ecosystems controlled by game developers.[31]

Lakeman establishes that this civil law conclusion does not govern criminal liability. The decision provides criminal law protection for players who fall victim to account hacking and unauthorised transfers. However, the judgment’s emphasis on assets being ‘idiosyncratic’ and requiring case-by-case analysis creates uncertainty.[32]

Not all virtual items will necessarily qualify as property. The court identified established exceptions to section 4, the specific statutory exclusions, the ‘pure information’ principle, intellectual property (protected by separate regimes), and sui generis exclusions like corpses.[33] Future cases must determine where virtual assets fall on the spectrum between functional property and excluded categories.

The court’s analysis of Jagex’s contractual terms reveals important limitations on developers’ ability to disclaim property interests. The Terms and Conditions stated that virtual currency ‘is not your own private property but rather ‘a measurement of the extent of your licence in a Jagex Product’.[34] The court found this language ‘at best ambivalent’ as to whether virtual currency constitutes the player’s property and, critically, ‘not determinative’ for criminal law purposes even if it successfully negated civil property rights.[35]

This creates a potential tension between game developers’ business models and legal reality. Many games incorporate virtual economies precisely because players value the assets they accumulate. Developers monetise this through sales of virtual currency whilst maintaining contractual control and disclaiming obligations to preserve asset values.

Lakeman establishes definitively that such contractual architectures cannot prevent virtual assets from constituting property for criminal law purposes where they function as such within the game’s economy.[36] Nevertheless, if virtual currencies in games constitute property capable of conversion to fiat currency, regulatory bodies may take greater interest in their operation, particularly where real-world trading markets exist despite contractual prohibitions. This connects to broader consumer protection developments, including evolving principles around fair treatment of in-game purchases and virtual assets.

The Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent in December 2025, and Lakeman, the first appellate decision, confirm that things digital or electronic in nature are ‘not prevented from being the object of personal property rights’ merely because they are neither things in possession nor choses in action.[37] However, as the Explanatory Notes emphasise, the Act ‘does not confirm the status of any particular thing’ as property, leaving courts to develop the common law.[38] Lakeman represents the first significant appellate contribution to this development in the criminal context post-enactment.

The judgment’s emphasis on functional characteristics rather than legal formalism provides a flexible framework for assessing novel digital assets. Non-fungible tokens (NFTs), utility tokens, stablecoins, and emerging forms of digital value representation will be evaluated based on whether they function as discrete, rivalrous assets capable of being bought, sold, and dishonestly appropriated. The court’s rejection of the need for civil law property rights removes a significant barrier to their protection under theft law, whilst the ‘pure information’ exception ensures appropriate limitations.

Conclusion

R v Lakeman marks a significant evolution in criminal law’s engagement with digital economies. By holding that RuneScape gold pieces constitute property within section 4 of the Theft Act 1968, the Court of Appeal has established three foundational principles that will shape theft law’s application to virtual assets.

First, the definition of property for criminal purposes is not constrained by civil law criteria. The Theft Act extends to anything that can ordinarily be described as capable of being stolen unless specific exceptions apply. Second, digital assets must be evaluated as functional entities distinct from the code that represents them. What matters is not the nature of the underlying data but the characteristics of the asset as it operates and is experienced. Third, whilst concepts like rivalrousness and the Ainsworth criteria may serve as helpful indicators, the determinative question is whether the asset can be the subject of dishonest dealing that deprives its possessor of genuine value.

These principles reflect a pragmatic judicial philosophy: that criminal law must adapt to technological change whilst maintaining conceptual coherence. The ‘pure information’ exception preserves appropriate limits. Knowledge itself cannot be owned or stolen. The functional approach ensures that genuinely valuable digital assets receive protection.

For the gaming industry, Lakeman provides clarity whilst raising new questions. Players now have criminal law protection against theft of valuable virtual assets, regardless of what contractual terms purport to say about property rights.  If an asset functions as property and is treated as such by players, contractual disclaimers will not prevent it from constituting property for theft purposes. Yet the judgment’s emphasis on case-by-case analysis based on idiosyncratic features means uncertainty remains about which virtual items will qualify as property and which will not. This uncertainty extends into the consumer protection sphere, where principles governing fair treatment of in-game assets may need further consideration if they have obtained the confirmed status as property capable of theft.

Lakeman forms part of a broader common law evolution in response to digitalisation. Read alongside the Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025, of which this is the first significant appellate interpretation, creates a coherent framework for tackling such cases in the future. Digital assets that function as discrete, rivalrous, valuable things capable of exclusive control constitute property for legal purposes, even when they exist only as instantiated code within computer systems. The law is beginning to recognise that in our increasingly digital world, property need not be tangible, or even a chose in action, to warrant protection.

The case also highlights the productive tension between criminal and civil law. Whilst civil courts will continue to develop property principles relevant to ownership, transfer, and commercial transactions, criminal courts must ensure that the Theft Act fulfils its purpose: protecting individuals from dishonest deprivation of valuable assets. Lakeman demonstrates that these parallel developments need not produce identical outcomes. A virtual asset might constitute property sufficient to ground a theft charge whilst lacking the characteristics necessary for enforceable civil property rights, and the criminal law is no worse for this divergence.

As technology continues to generate new forms of value and new modes of ownership, this approach, purposive, functional, and pragmatic, offers a template for how common law can evolve whilst maintaining coherence. The gold pieces of RuneScape may seem fleeting, but the principles established in protecting them are likely to prove enduring.

[1] R v Lakeman [2026] EWCA Crim 4.

[2] Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025; Property (Digital Assets) Bill: Explanatory Notes (HL Bill 1-EN, 2024) [21] – [24].

[3] Lakeman [15].

[4] Ibid.

[5] National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] A.C. 1175

[6] Lakeman [19].

[7]  Law Commission, Digital Assets: Consultation Paper (Law Com CP 256, 2023); Law Commission, Digital Assets: Final Report (Law Com No 412, 2024).

[8] National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] A.C. 1175

[9]Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Colliers [1940] AC 1014, 1051 (HL)

[10] Lakeman [44], [89].

[11]  Ibid [89].

[12] Ibid [40].

[13] R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241 (HL).

[14] Lakeman [41]–[43].

[15] Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Daniel Chan Nai-Keung. [1987] 1 WLR 1339 (PC).

[16] Oxford v Moss [1979] 68 Cr App Rep 183.

[17]  Lakeman [30].

[18]  Tulip Trading Ltd v Bitcoin Association BSV  [2023] EWCA Civ 83, 4 WLR 16 [72].

[19] Lakeman [30].

[20] Lakeman [7].

[21]  Law Commission, Digital Assets: Final Report [2.30].

[22] Ibid.

[23] Lakeman [31].

[24] Ibid.

[25] Tulip Trading [25]

[26] Law Commission, Digital Assets: Final Report [3.29].

[27] Lakeman [73].

[28] Lakeman [74].

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31]  Law Commission, Digital Assets: Consultation Paper.

[32] Ibid [4.84]

[33]  Lakeman [46], [89].

[34] Ibid, T&Cs cl 14(6).

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid [40]–[43].

[37] Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025, s 1.

[38] Property (Digital Assets) Bill: Explanatory Notes (HL Bill 1-EN, 2024) [21]–[24].